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Abstract
The main objectives of this study are to measure the  extent of voluntary disclosure of listed 
non‑financial firms in Ghana. The paper also seeks to identify the corporate governance attributes 
that influence voluntary disclosure, and finally, it rated the  importance of voluntary items in 
the  annual reports from the  viewpoint of investors in Ghana. The  paper makes use of 2013 to 
2016 annual reports for 17 firms. The  corporate governance attributes examined are board size, 
the proportion of independent non‑executive directors on the board, blockholder ownership and 
the audit committee. Five control variables were also used to support the study. We developed a total 
of 66 voluntary items. Both the simple frequency distribution and Stata software were employed to 
analyze the data. The findings revealed a mean of 32.7% as the level of voluntary disclosure. Board 
size, block holder ownership and audit committee had a positive association but only board size was 
statistically significant. The proportion of independent non‑executive directors had an insignificant 
negative relationship. Concerning the rating of the importance of the voluntary items, items under 
financial information were more of concern to investors. There are benefits that the findings provide 
which will be useful to investors, preparers of financial statements and regulators. The study reveals 
the corporate governance attribute(s) that influence corporate disclosure and points out the level of 
transparency if the level of disclosure is used as a proxy.
Keywords: corporate governance, voluntary disclosure, non‑financial, listed firms, investors, board 
size, audit committee
INTRODUCTION
Voluntary disclosure has become an area of 
interest in the field of accounting in current times. 
Advanced economies have it as a  commitment 
to institute a  robust regulatory framework and 
ensure its implementation with regards to its 
corporate governance. The  story is different in 
emerging economies which suffers from feeble 
regulatory environment and weak corporate 
governance structure leading to the expropriation 
of shareholders. There are several studies done 
in developed countries like (Li and Qi, 2008; 
Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008) and developing 
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countries like (Al‑Janadi and Rahman, 2013; 
Adelopo, 2011; Elfeky, 2017) which all focused on 
voluntary disclosure. The  topic became a  focus 
of interest when shocks of corporate scandals 
hit giant organizations like Enron in USA, 
Amir‑Mansour Aria in Iran, Pescanova in Spain, 
Malaysia Development Berhad, in Malaysia for 
the years 2001, 2013, 2010, 2018 respectively and 
financial loss occurred to stakeholders, therefore, 
the need for the discussion. Sufficient disclosure of 
information is an important issue to shareholders 
and investors since they tie disclosure to 
transparency. Low level of disclosure information 
result in information asymmetry which in effect 
debars investors to have trust in corporate annual 
reports and confidence in firms. The annual report 
which captures financial position and performance 
is expected to provide useful, reliable and relevant 
information to user groups for economic decision 
making and to show the  prospects that holds for 
the corporate organization.
The study is premised on the following motivation. 
The  paper is the  first of its kind especially with 
the  third objective (to rate the  importance of 
voluntary disclosure from the  viewpoint of 
investors). The  study provides further literature 
on voluntary disclosure study in Ghana. It adds to 
literature corporate governance variables which 
are found to be significant in explaining voluntary 
disclosure in an emerging country like Ghana. 
Finally, the study results also present fair knowledge 
to users’ group such as (investors, creditors, etc.) on 
how much more information listed non‑financial 
firms disclose. Knowledge about this informs them 
to question and request more information from 
the firms open to the capital market.
There are three objectives developed for 
the study stated as follows:
1) To examine the  extent of voluntary disclosure 
by listed non‑financial firms on GSE in their 
annual reports
2) To identify the corporate governance attributes 
that determine the level of voluntary disclosure.
3) To rate the level of importance of the voluntary 
disclosure items for listed non‑financial firms in 
Ghana.
After this section the  organization was as 
follows, literature review. It further developed 
the  hypotheses for the  study. It also looked at 
research design, the data collection and sample as 
last but one main heading presents the analysis of 
results and discussion. The  summary, conclusion 




The concept of corporate governance notably 
comes with a  positive contribution to an 
organization especially when potential scandalous 
deals can threaten or cause corporate failure. 
History has it to tell when corporate giants 
like WorldCom and Enron collapsed, reason 
assigned to corporate governance issues. This 
makes the  concept pivotal in quality circles 
and discussion platforms being it professional 
or academic. Corporate governance aims to 
ensure that stakeholders are secured from some 
scathe decisions from management which could be 
detrimental to the stakeholders in the long run. 
OECD (2004), added that corporate governance 
is defined as the relationship between a company’s 
board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Corporate governance may be upheld both 
internally or externally. Internal governance 
is about the  interaction that exists among 
management, board and shareholders. The external 
governance is overseen by external organizations. 
In Ghana regulators such as central bank, GSE and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have 
the obligation to ensure firms are responsible and 
best corporate governance are practiced according 
to the law.
Ghana has its own corporate governance codes 
with the  regulatory framework enshrined in 
the  Companies code 1963 (Act 179), Securities 
and Industry Law 1993 (PNDCL 333) as revised in 
the Security Industry (Amendment) Act, 2000 (Act 
590) and the listing regulations, 1990 (L.I. 1509) of 
Ghana Stock Exchange all to ensure an effective 
and sound practice of corporate governance. 
These codes spell out the  extracting benefits 
through efficiency, internal control, transparency, 
probity, accountability, board structure, director’s 
responsibility among others.
The corporate governance mechanism sets 
the  rules straight to ensure a  mitigation of 
agency cost, that is to basically drive down cost 
of information asymmetry and in effect increase 
firms value. Better performing stock has an 
association with firms that have higher disclosure 
quality (Mitton, 2002). The  authors further 
added that a  very vital ingredient of corporate is 
the disclosure quality and the amount of disclosure 
made available to users. It is observed that capital 
providers consider the  effectiveness of corporate 
governance to allocate resources to sound 
corporate organization. The  value of a  firm is 
the requisite factor that providers of capital dwells 
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on to extend funds to corporate business having in 
mind an expected return to the owners.
Corporate Governance and Disclosure 
Prior studies concentrate on factors affecting 
the  extent of voluntary disclosure. The  factors 
are corporate attributes, ownership structure 
and corporate governance (Herath and Altamimi, 
2017). All these are factors to be addressed to 
wholly conclude on the  response of voluntary 
disclosure. Umpteen studies have been 
conducted in recent times focusing on measuring 
the  association between corporate governance 
and voluntary disclosure. Studies like Al Markati 
and Hamdan (2017) in Bahrain, Akhtaruddin et al. 
(2009) in Malaysia, Al‑Janadi and Rahman (2013) 
in Saudi Arabia, Adelopo (2011) in Nigeria,  Elfeky 
(2017) in Egypt, Li and Qi (2008) China, Donnelly 
and Mulcahy (2008) in Ireland, Eng and Mak 
(2003) in Singapore, Al‑Shammari and Al‑Sultan 
(2010) in Kuwait, Rouf (2011) in Bangladesh, Kent 
(2008) in Australia, Liu, Valenti and Chen (2016) 
in Taiwan, Agyei and Gyamerah (2016); Bokpin 
and Issahaq (2009) both in Ghana all examined 
corporate governance mechanism that influences 
the level of voluntary disclosure. 
There is a growing interest in the area because 
of the  keen interest of investors and other user 
group. The  perception investors have about 
a  firm has a  long way to go to assist the  firm’s 
access funds from the  capital market or not. 
Al‑Markati (2017) opined that managers choice to 
disclose information freely to both the  investor 
and the general public is to provide an insight of 
the value of the firm. There is an expectation from 
managers to disclose information which users 
can look through to the underlying efficiency of 
a firm. Kumar, Langberg and Sivaramakrishnan 
(2012) suggested that managers will make 
available information to enhance their image, 
boost firms stock prices basically when it 
comes to allocation of capital and also goes to 
the  extreme to disclose obnoxious details to 
attract investment efficiency.
Voluntary disclosure is the  free choice of 
information that is disclosed by managers. It is done 
on purpose by the firms since it signals transparency 
and openness to the public in order to give the 
firm a good outlook. Though an external factor, it 
reduces agency cost which is caused by information 
asymmetry between managers and stakeholders 
(Herath and Altamimi, 2017). Considering the  role 
of voluntary disclosure policy and its impact, most 
recent study in corporate governance has been 
done on voluntary disclosure both in developed and 
developing markets (Herath and Altamimi, 2017).
Development of Hypotheses
The second objective of the study is to examine 
the  association between corporate governance 
variables and voluntary disclosure in the corporate 
annual reports of listed non‑financial firms in 
Ghana. The  corporate governance variables used 
as the explanatory variable of the study are board 
size, the proportion of independent non‑executive 
directors, block holder ownership and audit 
committee.
Board Size
Board size is an important corporate governance 
variable. The  total membership of a  firm’s board 
consists of both executive and non‑executive 
directors. Hussainey and Wang (2010) indicated that 
the management control over a board is contingent 
on the  size of the  board. Cost of monitoring 
increases to keep the  agency problem within 
check when there is a  relatively small size board. 
It is important for boards to have composition of 
adept personnel to make key long‑term strategic 
decisions. Haniffa and Cook (2002) stated that large 
size with a pool of experience, knowledgeable and 
independent directors is key to board size since 
it ensures effective firm monitoring and control. 
Adelopo (2011) submitted that there is a  positive 
relation between voluntary disclosure and board 
size. Conversely, Cheng and Courtenary (2006) 
reported a contrary result to their hypothesis. They 
concluded that large board size has negative effect 
on board performance. 
H1: There is a positive association between board 
size and voluntary disclosure.
Independent Executive Directors (InED)
They are directors who do not form part of 
management of the  organization. They are not 
engaged in the routine activities of the organization 
unlike executive directors who are full of 
responsibilities on the  day‑to‑day operation of 
the  firm (Akhtaruddin  et  al., 2009). The  true 
independence of the  board of directors (BOD) 
to have an unbiased approach to decision rest 
much with the  independent executive directors. 
A  larger representation of them on the  board 
ensures effective monitoring, enhance disclosure 
of information by management and inadvertently 
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positions stakeholders in a safer state. The corporate 
governance code of Ghana compels firms to have 
at least a third of the total membership of the board 
as independent directors (Agyemang et al., 2013). 
A  higher percentage of non‑executive directors 
was said to be related with high extent of voluntary 
disclosure under the  study “board composition, 
regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure” using 
104 firms in Singapore (Cheng and Courtenay, 
2006). Donnely and Mulcahy (2008) also found 
a  positive relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and the  number of non‑executive 
directors on the  board. On the  contrary 
(Al‑Shammari and Al‑Sutan, 2010) found no 
significant relationship between independent 
non‑executive directors and voluntary disclosure. 
Firms with higher independent non‑executive 
directors ensure forward looking and strategic 
information disclosure. Below is the hypothesis for 
the literature:
H2: There is a positive relation between the ratio 
of InED and voluntary disclosure
Block Holder Ownership
Ownership composition is also a  key feature 
under corporate governance. Corporate 
organizations have variety of shareholders 
which include government, managers, board 
members and other outsiders with different 
share percentage. Eng and Mak (2003) measured 
blockholder ownership as substantial shareholder’s 
percentage of ordinary shares held (that is having 
5% or more shareholdings). It is observed that most 
shareholders with more than 5% are institutional 
investors. And these investor group possess 
financial expertise and are well able to interpret 
the information disclosed in the annual reports of 
corporate activities and for that reason demands 
more from managers as disclosure. Hence it is 
expected that voluntary disclosure increases with 
increases in blockholder ownership. Eng and 
Mak (2003) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find no 
relationship between the two though. 
H3:  There is a  positive association between 
blockholder ownership and the  level of voluntary 
disclosure.
Audit Committee
Compliance with best practices is the  expected 
benchmark from management of firms. 
Monitoring of control system and quality reporting 
is left to the  audit committee of a  corporate firm. 
Audit committees are tasked to have an oversight 
responsibility on information disclosure and also 
to provide error‑free and accurate information 
and the  sound execution of that mandate exact 
confidence on the  financial statement (Baroko, 
2007). The  legal and regulatory framework of 
corporate governance in Ghana enjoins firms to 
have an audit committee compose of at least three 
(3) directors with independent non‑executive 
directors been the  majority (CGCG, 2010). 
Al‑Shammari and Al‑Sutan (2010) concluded in 
their study that the  existence of audit committee 
was significantly related to the  level of voluntary 
disclosure. Akhtaruddin  et  al. (2009) believed in 
the  positive relationship, however the  hypothesis 
was not confirmed in their study. The  result was 
consistent with the  study conducted in Egypt by 
Elfeky (2017). This stem from the  fact that audit 
committee is not mandatory under the  corporate 
governance code of Egypt. The  hypothesis 
generated was,
H4:  There is a  positive relationship between 




The study was conducted on firms listed on 
the  Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) with the  scope 
focused on non‑financial firms. Out of the  41 
firms listed on the GSE as at 30th June, 2018, a total 
of 17 firms were selected for the  study. These 
were firms listed before 2016 and also had their 
annual reports assessed. A  total of 24 firms were 
excluded, expressed as 13 financial firms and 11 
non‑financial firms listed after 2016 or without an 
available annual report.
Data Collection
The study used both primary and secondary 
sources of data. Concerning the  secondary data, 
the  predictive and control variables were all 
obtained from the annual reports of the sampled 
firms. Questionnaires were used as the  primary 
collection tool to rate the  importance of each 
disclosure item. The  questionnaire had a  list of 
66 disclosure items categorized under companies 
information, financial information, projected 
information, employee information, corporate 
governance information, environment and 
social policy information and management 
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analysis. The  voluntary items were large 
enough to cover relevant and wide aspect of 
corporate entity. It is relevant because it touches 
on the  general overview of the  firm, corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), financial information, 
future oriented information and the  other three 
categories looked at disclosed items related to 
insider users (employees and management). 
The  company information deals with corporate 
overview, and the  projected information deals 
with futuristic information disclosed to know 
the companies line of strategy (eg of the projected 
disclosure item is “effect of business strategy on 
future performance”. Other categories include 
financial information and environment and social 
policy information to address Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). The  last three are centered 
to address how important the disclosure relevant 
to user group like employees, management is to 
the  investors therefore the  need for employee 
information, management analysis and corporate 
governance information. The  disclosure items 
were developed in consultation with disclosure 
checklist used by (Binh, 2012, Wong and Ho, 
2001). The items were cross checked for inclusion 
into the questionnaire by 2 chartered accountants. 
This was to verify the  relevance of the  items in 
relation to the  reporting environment in Ghana. 
The  questionnaires were sent to investor groups 
in Ghana both individual and institutional. Their 
contact lists were obtained from Ghana Investment 
Promotion Centre (GIPC) a government institution 
which co‑ordinates and monitors all investment 
activities and assists domestic and foreign 
investors. The questionnaire document in a goggle 
form was sent via email to 126 investors to rate 
the importance of the 66 disclosure items. 41 out 
of the  126 questionnaires representing (32%) 
were returned all in three weeks. After two weeks 
of gathering the  responses from the  issuance 
of the  questionnaire, a  reminder was sent 
with additional week to gather the  remainder. 
The rating score was scaled from 1 to 5 where 1 
is “not important”, 2 “somewhat important’, 3 
“important”, 4 “very important” and 5 “essential”. 
A simple frequency distribution was employed to 
compute the average score of each disclosed item. 
The disclosure score index by each firm was then 
divided on the maximum score. 
Model Specification
To examine the association between the dependent 
variable and the  predictive and control variables, 
a linear multiple regression model was constructed. 














VD = Voluntary disclosure index for each sample firm
BSIZE = Board size
PINED =  Proportion of independent non‑executive 
directors
BHOLD = Block holder Ownership





ATYPE =  Type of external auditor
α = constant
β1  –  β9 =  estimated coefficient of the predictive and 
control variables
ε = error term
Development of Voluntary Disclosure Index
Empirical study has examined the  disclosure 
behavior of firms using a  disclosure checklist. 
There are two widely used approaches 
of disclosure index namely weighted and 
unweighted. For the  study both approaches were 
used. To arrive at the level of voluntary disclosure, 
the  unweighted disclosure index was used. This 
is mostly appropriate where the study is not user 
specific (Cooke, 1989). The  items were scored 
using a dichotomous approach where a score of 1 
applies for disclosure of item and 0 for otherwise, 
subject to the  applicability of the  disclosed item. 
The  disclosure score of the  items for the  firms is 
the  total score of each item for the  companies. 
The mathematical expression of the disclosure item 
is given as:
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di =  1 if the item di is disclosed in the annual report, 
and otherwise 0. 
n =  total number of the companies’ annual reports 
in the sample
Secondly, to rate the  importance of the  items 
from the  viewpoint of investors, the  weighted 
index was used. This is where the  rating score of 
the  respondents apply. The  mean score of each 
disclosure item is given as:
Mean score for each item =
 = Total score marked by 41 investors for the item
Expected Maximum score marked by 41 investors
Contrary argument was raised contending that 
there isn’t significant difference in results for both 
results for both approaches of indexing. Chaw and 
Wong‑Boren (1987) obtained same results under 
unweighted and weighted index
Measurement of Independent Variables
Explanatory variables
The data on the  independent variables were 
all secured from the  corporate annual reports for 
the  study period 2013 to 2016. The data captured 
details on board size, independent non‑executive 
directors on the  board, audit committee and 
Shareholders with holding greater than or 
equal to 5%. Ho and Taylor (2010) asserted that 
the attributes are used to create a composite proxy 
measure to make known the corporate governance 
structure strength of a  firm. The dichotomous 
measurement is still applied for these corporate 
governance attributes. A  value of 1 is assigned 
for each attribute that is presumed to reinforce 
the  voluntary disclosure practice of a  firm, and 0 
otherwise.
Control variables
As control variables, the  study used firms’ 
characteristics which are also considered to 
influence the  level of voluntary disclosure 
behavior. These consist of firm size, return on asset, 
return on equity, leverage and the  auditing firm. 
A brief description for the selection of the control 
variable is given as follows:
i) firm size – Naser, Al‑khatib and Karbhari (2002) 
hinted that user groups are always soliciting for 
information from the  annual report to make 
informed decision. It is noted that larger firms 
have a commitment to disclose voluntarily more 
information to users to aid their judgement. 
I: Measurement of Variables
Variable Hypothesis Measurement Exp. Sign
Dependent Variable
Voluntary Disclosure Voluntary Disclosure Index
Explanatory Variables




H2 The percentage of non‑executive directors to the total number of directors on the board +
Block holder Ownership H3 The proportion of ordinary shares owned by substantial shareholders (with shares of 5% or more) +
Proportion for audit 
committee members
H4 The percentage of the audit committee to total board 
membership +
Control Variables
Return on Asset The earnings after tax and interest expressed as a ratio on Total Asset +
Return on Equity The earnings after tax and interest expressed as a ratio on Shareholder’s Equity +
Leverage The ratio of long‑term debt to the book value of equity +
Firms Size Proxy using TCE and measured in log of TCE, Log of TCE +
Auditor Type Audited by a Big Four Auditing firm +
Source: Authors own construct
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Studies like (Elfeky, 2017; Akhtaruddin  et  al., 
2009) used this characteristic.
ii) Profitability (ROA and ROE)  –  several studies 
have hypothesized an association between 
voluntary disclosure and profitability. High 
profit is an indicator of success and managers 
always seeks to justify their compensation 
package (Barako, 2007) and are always willing 
to use the opportunity to disclose large amount 
of information. This happens for firms which 
make high profit and this is in line with 
the signal theory (Inchausti, 1997). The  impact 
profit can have on the  voluntary disclosure 
makes it justified to include it in the  study as 
a control variable. 
iii) Auditor type – Wallace and Naser (1995) reveals 
that firms audited by BIG 4 accounting firms are 
compelled to disclose beyond the  mandatory 
information to cover the  voluntary ones. BIG 
4 auditing firms have a  reputation to protect 
and are independent, which causes client firms 
to disclose more information as expected (De 
Angelo, 1981). Secondly, being audited by the BIG 
4 also reduces the agency cost since firms which 
engage them send signal their commitment not 
to conceal or hide any information from users 
(De Angelo, 1981) 
iv) Leverage – Highly leverage firms reduces agency 
cost through provision of information beyond 
the mandated one. This is to provide assurance 
to debtholders concerning the security of their 
principal and interest (Al‑Shammari, 2008). 
Firms with high leverage tends to have high 
monitoring costs, therefore makes them disclose 
more information. Akhtaruddin  et  al. (2009) 
found no evidence for similar study.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics of the variables
Tab. II reports on the  descriptive statistics 
for the  sample firms. The  results from 
the  disclosure index indicate a  mean of 32.7% 
with the  maximum score achieved by a  firm as 
79.7% and the  minimum is 4.4% with a  standard 
deviation of 20%. There is a  clear indication that 
the  firms are widely distributed with regards to 
voluntary disclosure. The average disclosure index 
is arguably regarded as low compared to studies 
like (Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), 53.2%; Elfeky (2017) 
34.26%) but greater than findings in studies like 
(Alfraih (2015), Albitar (2015) and Donnelly and 
Mulcahy (2008) for Kuwait (23%) Jordan (32.4%) 
Ireland (21.4%) respectively).
The report shows clearly that the average size of 
the board is 8.45 with the maximum and minimum 
sizes of 14 and 3 respectively. There is a significant 
proportion of independent non‑executive directors 
represented on board at a  mean of 61.6% better 
interpreted as, for every 10 directors, 6 are 
independent non‑executive directors. Almost 3 
out of 10 directors are represented on the  audit 
committee showing as 29% in Tab. II. This is close 
to the  requirement of the  corporate governance 
code requirement in Ghana which expects firms 
to have at least 33% representation of directors on 
the  audit committee. The  statistics also indicates 
a  mean of 79% of shares held by block holders 
II: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Dependent Variable
TVD (%) 32.7 20 4.4 79.7
Explanatory variable
BSIZE 8.455 3.053 3 14
PINED (%) 61.6 22.5 14.3 88.8
BHOLD (%) 79 16.7 27.3 100
AUDCOM (%) 29.1 18.9 0 100
Control variable
FSIZE (GHC, million) 7.069 2.579 6.52 10.033
LEV (%) –53.2 872.4 –7034 1096
ROA (%) –16.4 109.8 –774 61.6
ROE (%) –10.3 100.1 –684 230
ATYPE (%) 70.5 45.9 0 100
Source: Stata results
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which was substantial. For the  control variables, 
the  leverage shows an average ratio of debt 
to equity of –53.2%, explained as long‑term 
debt occupies a significantly lower portion of 
the  capital structure. The  results present an 
average of –16.4% and –10.3% for ROA and ROE 
respectively. This indicates an overall negative 
return both on total asset and shareholders’ equity 
respectively for the  sample firms. The  average 
for auditor type is 70.5% explained as 7 out of 10 
annual reports were audited by any one of the 4 
big Accounting firms. Lastly, the average firm size 
is (GHC, million) 7.069 and this relates to the value 
of the total asset held by the firm.
Univariate Analysis
The test for the  correlation was done for all 
the  variables which showed a  number of strong 
correlations between some independent variables 
with the  largest reported correlation value at 
(0.794) between leverage and ROE as indicated in 
Tab. III. Considering the level of correlation among 
the  variables, there was no multicollinearity 
problem since none of the correlation values was 
above the critical value of 0.80 according to (Cooper 
and Schindler, 2008)
Multiple Regression Analysis
From the  study, Tab.  IV reports the  results of 
the multiple regression analysis. The Table shows 
the results for 3 models. The first estimate is the full 
model which shows the  association between 
the level of disclosure and the 4 predictive and 5 
control variables. The estimate of the second and 
third variable looks at the full model without ROA 
and ROE which are profitability variables (control 
variable) for restricted model 1 and restricted 
model 2 respectively. The  restricted models are 
used to test for robustness of the main model. Lu 
and White (2014) suggested that for robustness 
check, there is a  regression specification 
modification by adding or eliminating a regressor 
which causes certain key regression coefficient to 
behave.
Restricted Model 1
The model is the same as the full model but short 
of ROA which is a  control variable. The  model as 
shown in Tab.  IV, with 8 independent variables 
explains 43% of the  variance in the  disclosure 
level. The  study is significant (p value = 0.001) 
with F = 5.61. According to this model, Board size 
is the only predictive variable which is statistically 
significant (p > 0.001).
Restricted Model 2
This model regresses the  level of voluntary 
disclosure on all the  explanatory variables and 
the  control variables (excluding ROE). Board size 
and proportion of independent non‑executive 
directors are seen to be statistically significant at 
p = 0.001 and p = 0.077 respectively. From Tab.  4, 
R‑square is 0.39 which tells us that the model based 
on the results from the current data explains 39% 
of the  variation in the  level of disclosure. This 
means that, the model is 39% efficient in predicting 
variances in voluntary disclosure.
III: Pearson Correlation coefficient
Variable TVD BSIZE PINED BHOLD AUDCOM FSIZE LEV ROA ROE ATYPE
BSIZE 0.505*** 1
PINED –0.149 0.171 1
BHOLD 0.262** 0.273** –0.058 1
AUDCOM 0.318*** 0.362*** –0.37** 0.014 1
FSIZE –0.241** –0.123 0.032 –0.032 –0.18 1
LEV 0.148 –0.627 –0.071 –0.084 0.02 –0.026 1
ROA 0.193 0.299** –0.004 0.225 0.286** 0.100 –0.007 1
ROE 0.240** –0.084 –0.148 0.088 0.0475 –0.027 0.794*** 0.169 1
ATYPE 0.185 0.427*** –0.192 0.217* 0.428*** –0.049 –0.098 0.27** –.08 1
Note: * p < 0.10, two‑tailed; **p < 0.05, two‑tailed; *** p < 0.01, two‑tailed;
Source: Stata results
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Full Model
The regression results in Tab.  IV shows 
the  association between voluntary disclosure 
level and 4 explanatory variables as well as 5 
control variables. The  result shows an F value of 
4.93 which is significant at 0.000. The R Square is 
recorded at 43% with an adjusted R square of 35%. 
These details suggest that a significant percentage 
of voluntary disclosure can be explained by 
the  variations using the  full set of independent 
variables. 
The multiple regression results show that board 
size is statistical significantly at (p = 0.000) with 
a  coefficient of 0.035. The  results show a  positive 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
board size meaning H1 is supported. This seeks to 
suggest that a  larger board is positively related to 
the  level of voluntary disclosure since with their 
collection of expertise, it allows for making better 
decision and sufficient discretionary disclosure. 
This result is consistent with the studies of (Albitar, 
2015; Alhazaimeh, Palaniappan and Almsafir 2014; 
Nadndi and Ghosh, 2012; Allegrini and Greco 
2011) unlike the studies of (Elfeky, 2017, Gyamerah 
and Agyei, 2016) which showed a  negative 
association. The  transparency and disclosure 
of a  firm’s information is contingent on the  size 
of the  board since large board is viewed as an 
effective governing mechanism to disclose more 
information.
The ratio of the  proportion of independent 
non‑executive directors was used as another 
explanatory variable which showed a  negative 
coefficient of 0.156 showing (p value = 0.147) 
level which is insignificant. The  study hypotheses 
stated that the  higher proportion of InED, 
the  more voluntary information disclosed. 
However, the  result of the  study doesn’t confirm 
H2. The  result is inconsistent with the  studies of 
(Akhtaruddin  et  al., 2009; Donnely and Mulcahy, 
2008; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006) but is supported 
by the  studies of (Albitar, 2015; Barako, 2007; Ho 
and Wong, 2001).
The next corporate governance variable is 
the  block holder ownership. The  regression 
coefficient for the variable is 0.187 which is positive 
and statistically insignificant at the  0.155 level. 
The  study hypothesis is supported. To take into 
account the result, firms with a higher proportion 
of blockholdership, tend to disclose more voluntary 
information. Most blockholders are notably 
institutional shareholders who are well informed 
and are intelligent and much is demanded from 
IV: Multiple Regression Results
Variables Full Model Restricted Model 1 Restricted Model 2
  Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value
Explanatory
BSIZE 0.035*** 0.000 0.034*** 0.001 0.034*** 0.001
PINED –0.156 0.147 –0.161 0.128 –0.193* 0.077
BHOLD 0.187 0.155 0.178 0.162 0.160 0.231
AUDCOM 0.086 0.540 0.075 0.579 0.066 0.644
Control
FSIZE –0.011 0.163 –0.012 0.134 –0.012 0.132
LEV –0.003 0.495 –0.002 0.533 0.004 0.131
ROA –0.007 0.744 0.008 0.704
ROE 0.071** 0.05 0.066** 0.047
ATYPE –0.053 0.318 –0.054 0.296 –0.060 0.266
const. 0.077 0.624 0.099 0.486 0.146 0.359
F‑statistics 4.93 5.61 4.79
F‑sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.43 0.43 0.39
Adjusted R2 0.35   0.35   0.31  
Note: * p < 0.10, two‑tailed; **p < 0.05, two‑tailed; *** p < 0.01, two‑tailed;
Source: Stata results
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managers to disclose to protect their interest. 
The result is consistent with the study of Eng and 
Mak (2003) but not consistent with (Elfeky, 2017; 
Albitar, 2015)
The regression coefficient for the  board audit 
committee is (0.086) which is positive and 
statistically insignificant at the  (p value = 0.540) 
level and the  hypothesis is supported. The  study 
indicates that higher board members on the audit 
committee may have positive impact on the  level 
of voluntary disclosure. This study is similar 
to the  study of (Gyamerah and Agyei, 2016; 
Al‑Shammari and Al‑Sutan, 2010; Haniffa, 2008). 
The  larger the  audit committee members who 
are often with accounting experience, the  more 
transparent and accurate disclosure they 
encourage managers to present.
The study results show that all the  control 
variables are insignificant and have a  negative 
coefficient except ROE which has a  positive 
association with voluntary disclosure and is also 
statistically significant (p value = 0.50). Firms 
which are larger in size and are mostly profitable 
showed no evidence of making more voluntary 
disclosures. This is consistent with the  results 
reported by Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) for Malaysian 
firms. The coefficient for the nature of audit firms 
is insignificant, and hence, unrelated to voluntary 
disclosure. Similarly, leverage, another control 
variable did not provide any significant result that 
is consistent with Chen and Jaggi (2000). 
Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis is conducted on the  study 
using the  profitability variables namely ROA 
and ROE. In restricted model 1, ROA is excluded 
from the  model and this causes a  slight change in 
the results compared to the full model. The restricted 
model 2, ROA was replaced with ROE as the measure 
of profitability. The  results differ from full model 
in that proportion of independent non‑executive 
directors’ turns to become statistically significant 
at (p value = 0.077). Overall, we conclude that using 
the full model only shows one explanatory variable 
is significant and positively associated to the level of 
voluntary disclosure.
The Actual Disclosure Level of the Firms
Reported from Tab.  V and VI, the  average 
voluntary disclosure for the  study was at 
a  moderate rate of 32.7%. The  result represents 
the rate at which the totality of the sampled firms 
disclosed the  voluntary items in their annual 
report. The result is consistent with the  results 
from developing economies where the  incentive 
for voluntary disclosure is not upheld in greater 
esteem. The  results extracted from the  firm’s 
annual reports indicated companies information 
and financial information categories as the highest 
disclosure levels with both disclosing 48.74% each 
followed by environment and social policy (48.03%) 
and the  last three categories been corporate 
governance information, projected information 
and employee information. Their actual disclosure 
scores were 24%, 16.17% and 6.86% respectively. 
Binh (2012) a  study of non‑financial listed firms 
in Vietnam also disclosed corporate information 
to have the  highest level of disclosure at 70.17%. 
In similar study conducted by Barako (2007), 
the study concluded an upward change in the level 
of disclosure for general and strategic information. 
Concerning the items, four disclosure items under 
Companies information category made it in 
the  first 10 highest disclosure with the  first three 
emerging from this category (General information 
about the economy (94.11%), description of major 
goods / products (94.11%) and corporate mission 
statement (82.35%). The  companies information 
just provides general details about the  company 
and its interaction with the  environment and 
the disclosure of such information looks relatively 
cheap, easy to ascertain, and unimportant to 
competitors therefore the  high presence of those 
disclosure is not surprising. Similar reports from 
these studies (Binh, 2012; Al‑Shammari, 2008; 
Barako, 2007) were noted.
The financial information category tied with 
the  same average like the  companies information 
showing three items among the  highest 10 
perceived important items to investors. The  items 
namely (4th place, information on share price 
(82.35%), retained earnings (5th – 82.35%) and 
finally at 7th place, summary of financial data for 
the  last two years or over (70.6). Investors return 
is paramount and information disclosed under 
this category is an evidence of making known 
their interest. The  financial information provides 
information about the  earnings in terms of trend 
and other shareholder information which reveals 
the financial character of the firms.
Corporate governance information was 
regarded as the  fifth for the  categories, however 
two items were captured among the  first ten 
highest items namely director’s shareholdings in 
the company and other related interests (e.g. stock 
options)  –  52.94% and Name, age and address of 
directors (52.9%). This seeks to suggest there is 
the  demand about the  firm’s directors and as an 
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V: Perceived importance of voluntary disclosure of investors and Actual Disclosure Level (%) of 7 categories in annual reports
Order Categories
Mean rating Average Actual
Score Disclosure (%)
1 Management Analysis 3.28 47.06
2 Environment and Social policy 3.25 48.03
3 Projected Information 3.21 16.17
4 Companies Information 3.20 48.74
5 Financial Information 3.19 48.74
6 Corporate Governance Information 3.02 24.00
7 Employee Information 2.89 6.86
Source: Frequency distribution result
VI: The first 10 highest actual disclosure by firms’ annual reports
Ranks Index Items
No. Of Firms actual
Index Disclosure (%)
1 General information about the economy 1 94.11
2 Description of major goods / products 4 94.11
3 Corporate mission statement 2 82.35
4 Information on Share price  16 82.35
5 Retained profit 18 82.35
6 Brief history of the corporation (the establishment and development) 3 76.47
7 Summary of financial data for the last 2 years or over 15 70.6
8 Future outlook of the company 60 58.82
9 Directors’ shareholding in the company and other related interests (e.g. stock options) 50 52.94
10 Name, age and address of directors 46 52.90
Source: Frequency distribution results
VII: The most imp. items by the view point of investors with the firms ’Actual Disclosure Level
Number
Index Items
Mean rating Average Act.
Index Score Disclosure (%)
16 Share price information 3.83 82.35
60 Future outlook of the company 3.83 58.82
1 General information about the economy 3.71 94.11
2 Corporate mission statement 3.63 82.35
26 Effect of business strategy on future performance 3.56 41.17
19 Bank loan, mortgage and their use 3.56 29.41
21 Foreign currency fluctuation information during the year 3.54 17.64
18 Retained profit 3.51 82.35
48 Skills and experiences of directors 3.51 47.06
14 Significant issues during the year 3.49 35.3
Source: Frequency distribution results
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issue of interest information about them needed to 
be disclose for the usage of investors.
Tab. VII provides the  report on the  10 most 
important items from the  view of investors. 
The ranking started from share price information, 
future outlook through to significant issues during 
the year at a mean rating score of (3.83, 3.83 …….. 
to 3.49) respectively. Most of the information were 
found under the  financial information (namely 
share price information, bank loan and their use, 
foreign currency fluctuation information during 
the  year and retained profit) ranked as 1st, 6th, 7th 
and 8th respectively. Financial information items 
are the  most important items in the  voluntary 
disclosure information. The 6th and 7th place items 
had a  very moderately low actual disclosure rate 
reason assigned that those items can be easily 
reached by the users through available information 
in financial statement (Binh, 2012). The  desirable 
level of disclosure expected from investors are 
deemed relatively higher than the actual disclosure 
(34.22%) made by the firms.
CONCLUSION
There are three objectives for the study. To address the initial objective, which is to measure the level 
of voluntary disclosure by listed non‑financial firms in Ghana, the paper reported a mean of 32.7%. 
The report arguably is regarded very low compared to studies like (Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), 53.2%; 
Elfeky (2017) 34.26%) but greater than findings in studies like (Alfraih (2015), Albitar (2015) and 
Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) for Kuwait (23%) Jordan (32.4%) Ireland (21.4%) respectively). 
The results also provide evidence on the positive association for three corporate governance variables 
with only board size, showing statistical significance. Blockholder ownership and audit committee 
also had a positive association with the level of voluntary disclosure but insignificant. Proportion of 
independent non‑executive directors to the board was insignificant with a negative association with 
the voluntary disclosure. 
Companies information and financial information categories had the  highest disclosure level 
in the  annual reports. The  results are consistent with studies like Al‑Shammari (2008) in Kuwait 
and Barako (2007) in Kenya. With regards to the  ratings by investors, the  financial information 
category had dominant items among the  first ten highest items. The  ranking started from share 
price information, future outlook and thirdly, significant issues during the year and so on. The key 
importance of this objective is to make input in upgrading the quality of reports by Ghanaian firms. 
Little disclosure was made on corporate governance information and employee information and 
a  recommendation is for the  firms to improve in the  level of disclosure for those items in those 
categories which would deepen investors knowledge about the firms.
To answer the third research objective, that is to rate the importance of voluntary disclosure from 
the  view point of investors, the  overall actual level of disclosure was 32.7% which is arguably 
regarded very low.
To conclude there is arguably a low level of transparency especially with regards to the free choice 
of information disclosure. Though higher level of voluntary disclosure does not necessarily mean 
higher disclosure notwithstanding, low disclosure can also be suggested as the  result of the  lack 
of legal enforcement by the regulators. Since the capital market ties provision of capital to firm’s 
performance, sufficient relevant disclosure and best practice of corporate governance, it is 
recommended for firms to improve their level of transparency through disclosure in other to give 
investors’ confidence to enable the former to attract capital. 
More so preparers of the annual report need to disclose much more information based on the findings 
so as to improve trust from investors in the  statement. This is important because the  need for 
information asymmetry is key between the  suppliers of funds and the  demanders of funds for 
mutual benefit which rest on how much disclosure a firm makes. 
The study makes three notable contributions. It adds up to the knowledge on corporate governance 
by empirically investigating the  impact that corporate governance attributes have on voluntary 
disclosures for listed non‑financial firms in Ghana. Secondly is where the  study brings to light 
the level of voluntary disclosure which are of concern to stakeholders such as regulators, researchers, 
accountants, financial analysts. Since the overall disclosure sheds light to aid investors in making 
informed decisions, stakeholders’ commitment to ensure sound voluntary disclosure practices 
is necessary to promote the capital market of the economy. The disclosure items which investors 
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prioritize is discovered in the study where emphasis is laid on individual items and the categories of 
the information as such. This is a unique contribution of its kind in Ghana.
The study has several implications for firms and regulators. These bodies have it as a  shared 
responsibility to improve the  transparency and voluntary disclosure practices. To the  firms 
the  knowledge of the  benefits of sufficient information disclosure may trigger an increase in 
voluntary disclosure. To the regulators, the study seeks to suggest the need for a guideline which will 
ensure proper voluntary disclosure practice in annual reports
The study has a handful of limitations to record. There is several information which can be extracted 
as disclosure information (examples include report from management meeting, financial press 
releases) however only information from annual report were used since it is regarded as the most 
imminent source of information for decision making. The study also limited itself to just a handful 
of corporate governance variables. Future studies could focus on addressing other variables such as 
family control, role duality just to mention but a few. Secondly, the study covered only non‑financial 
firms even excluding those annual reports couldn’t be accessed. An entire industry was excluded 
from the study notably financial institution. Covering other firms would be an interesting extension 
for further study. Lastly, further research should be opened to rate the  importance of voluntary 
disclosure from the view point of financial analyst or financial managers. This means that the results 
and its interpretation should not be a generalization for all firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange 
having the limitation in mind
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